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“Would you tell me, please, which way
I ought to walk from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you
want to go,” said the cat.
“I don’t much care where--,” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you
walk,” said the cat.
“But I don’t want to go among mad
people,” Alice remarked.
“Oh, you can’t help that,” said the cat,
“we’re all mad here. I’mmad, you’re mad.”
“How do YOU know I’m mad?” said Alice.
“You must be,“ said the
wouldn’t have come here.”
Like Alice in
Introduction
Wonderland, we are faced
cat, “or you
--Alice in Wonderland
with the task of rationalizing
an apparently irrational world when we try to determine the roles and con-
tributions of government policies to the world food situation. There are
probably more policies which bear on the world food situation than there
are countries, each country having several domestic policies of relevance
*Paper presented at the Carnegie-RochesterConference on Public Policy,
Carnegie-MellonUniversity, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 14-15, 1975.
**The author is professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, and Director, Economic Development Center, University of
Minnesota. I would like to thank Willard W. Cochrane and James P. Houck
for their helpful comments and suggestions.2
plus numerous internationalpolicies governing the collective behavior
of groups of nations. And, these many policies seem to head in all sorts
of directions. It is of little wonder that a noted agricultural economist
entitled a recent book on agriculturalpolicies World Agriculture in
Disarray.~/
How then can we hope to make sense out of such a chaotic situation?
Obviously, we must employ a mechanism for meaningfully simplifying a very
complex situation. The mechanism chosen is one that considers policies
from the standpoint of the broad objectives they are designed to achieve.
This approach permits us to classify various policies into a relatively
small number of categories. We must, of necessity, ignore the myriad
ways by which any
we will not focus
ence will be made
particular class of policy
on programmatic aspects of
to countries which tend to
might be implemented; i.e.,
policy implementation. Refer-
represent our different cate-
gories of policies, but no attempt is made to develop a comprehensive
survey of all nations.
The next section of the paper deals with a characterizationof the
current and prospective world food situation. The third section deals
with several different categories of policles and discusses how each
relates to various elements of the world food situation. In the final
section an attempt is made to develop some judgments about the relative
importance of different policies in shaping the perceived global state of
affairs with respect to food and agriculture.
~/D Gale ~ohn*on, world Agriculture in Disarray (London: Fontana,
1973). ‘3
The World Food Situation
Once again the spectre of a Malthuslan catastrophe has captured the
headlines. The tight food situation in 1972, 1973, and 1974 and the
prospects for relatively short supplies and high food prices in 1975 are
the sixth time in the last two centuries that there has been widespread
2/ concern about food shortages and famine.—
The world food situation in the 1950’s and 1960’s was reasonably
comfortable. There was excess production capacity in the developed coun-
tries reflected in combinations of surplus stocks of grain and land with-
held from production under governmental programs. Food production in the
less developed countries kept slightly ahead of population growth. The
increased production in the less developed countries together with
increased grain imports, a significant portion of it being food aid,
resulted in a modest but fairly steady increase in average levels of per
capita food consumption in the less developed countries. Except for the
severe droughts in South Asia during 1965 and 1966, the world food situa-
tion looked promising over a period of about two decades.
But, starting in 1970, the world
concern grew over mounting surpluses,
United States and Canada were reduced
Poor weather reduced grain production
food situation began to change. As
grain production and stocks in the
as a matter of government policy.
in Australia. The demand for grain
,./
‘lSee Martin E. Abel, “Food Production Possibilities in the High-Food-
Drain Economies,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50,
No. 5, December 1968, pp. 1273-82, for a brief historical review. During
this same period there were numerous, localized famines, some of consider-
able magnitude. These were generally considered to be isolated, transitory
events and did not influence global views about the growth of food supplies
relative to the growth of the demand for food.4
continued to grow at rapid and predictable rates in the inclus~rialized
countries, However, the eudden emargence of the USSR in 1972 a~ o mu~~lve
purchaser of grain was not predictable. Soviet grain purchases placed
great stress on existing grain supplies and reduced reserve stocks to
extremely low levels “setting off the greatest price boom, first in grains
,,3/ and then in animal products, in modern times. —
As Cochrane states:
The general surplus condition in the grains which existed
in 1970 was gone by the summer of 1972. Depending upon the
point of view, the world was, in June 1972: (a) in an economic
balance with regard to grain production and utilization; or
(b) teetering on a razor’s d e wfth respect to surplus or
47 g shortage, feast or famine.—
The “economic balance” or “razor’s edge” in grains has prevailed well into
1975 and is likely to continue in 1976. Poor weather in various places,
including the United States in 1974, has prevented world grain production
from increasing faster than demand and either reducing prices or allowing
grain stocks to be rebuilt in any significantamount.
In addition, the costs of agricultural inputs have risen significantly.
The rise in input prices has been due partly to the sharp rise in petroleum
products, which sharply escalated the price of fuel and nitrogen fertili-
zers, and partly to inflation,which has been widespread.
The price boom in agricultural commodities in the early 1970’s
3’Willard W. Cochrane, Feast or Famine: The Uncertain World of Food
and Agriculture and Its Policy Implications for the United States, National
Planning Association, Washington, D. C., February 1974, p. 2. This refer-
ence also contains an excellent summary of the numerous specific forces
that gave rise to the price boom of 1972.
~’Cochrane, ibid., p. 2.representeda substantial increase
forces at work to further increase
markets. The demand for food will
in real prices. There are powerful
the nominal prices of food in world
continue to grow as a result of
increasing population and rising per capita income. Continued general
inflationand increases in prices of key agricultural inputs, such as




It would appear that
Bringing additional land into production can be
at higher product prices because of the substantial
and the lower productivity of the additional land.
only an accelerated
would dampen increases in nominal prices
5/ of food does not continue to rise.—
It is useful to consider some of the
rate of technologicaladvance
and ensure that the real price
basic, long-term changes that
have taken place on the world food and agricultural scene as they relate
to the world food situation.
One important change has been the humanitarian revolution, largely
a post-World War II development,which resulted in large groups of people
feeling some obligation for the welfare of other peoples. As a minimum,
starvation on a large scale has become morally intolerable. Thus, we
observe the fairly new
of acts of nature such
of acts of man against
world’s food supplies.
phenomenon that people who face starvation because
as drought, earthquakes, pests, etc., and because
man, such as war, have a rightful claim on the
Droughts, such as occurred in South Asia in
5/ – This assessment assumes that climatic conditions remain normal. If,
as some climatologistsare predicting, there is a rapid deterioration in
climatic conditions, food production could be adversely affected and food
prices could soar.1965/66, 1966/67, and 1972/73; the long drought in Sub-SaharaAfrica;
and wars, in places like Nigeria and Bangladesh, create demands upon
world food supplies and exert significantupward pressures on food prices.
The days are gone when several million Bengalis could die of starvation,
as in the famine of 1943, without causing a ripple in the large world
food supply and price picture. Furthermore, this universal humanitarian
revolution has succeeded, as it should, in divorcing food needs from
effective purchasing power. In this respect, there is an element of
worldwide food distributionwhich is relatively insensitive to food prices
and national purchasing power as the mechanisms for allocating food sup-
plies.
A second change in the world food picture has been the rapid accelera-
tion in rates of population growth, especially in the developing countries,
which occurred in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Annual rates of population
growth in the range of 2.5 to 3.5 percent are now commonplace. The
increased rates of population growth reflect substantial declines in
death rates brought about by successful, large-scale public health pro-
grams, and improved systems of food distribution.
The rapid growth of incomes in the developed countries and in an
increasing number of less developed countries has resulted in a rapid
expansion of (a) demand for agricultural products and (b) agricultural
trade. This is another important dimension of the world food situation.
The rapid rates of growth in incomes are in part due to a growing ration-
alization of trade and production policies and are not, therefore, a
completely exogenous factor in explaining the growth in world agricultural
trade. Even though growth in trade based on growth of income and7
population, particularly in the developed countries, is predictable with
a reasonable degree of accuracy, the results can, nevertheless, be spec-
tacular. For example, U.S. agricultural exports to Japan increased from
$1.2 billion in 1969 to $3.5 billion in 1974.5’
A fourth change is the recent slowing of the rate of growth of agri-
cultural output in a number of less developed countries. During the late
1960’s food production in a number of developing countries received a sig-
nificant fillip from the introductionof the new high-yieldingvarieties
of wheat and rice. The adoption of these new varieties was especially
rapid in those areas where there were!adequate water supplies, abundant
fertilizer, and favorable prices. Once this production potential was
7/ exploited, the rate of adoption of the new varieties slowed.— Their
further spread will be conditioned by the rates at which (a) the quantity
and quality of irrigation can be expanded, (b) the new varieties can be
adapted to local conditions, (c) fertilizer supplies can be increased,
and (d) product-input price relations can be improved.
Finally, an important, but not fully appreciated, change in the
world food picture is the decision by a large number of countries to rely
on world markets for their food supplies beyond what can be explained
merely by growth in income and population. These are decisions which
move countries, sometimes suddenly, away from autarchic national
“Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., June 1975.
“Dana G. Dalrymple, Development and Spread of High-YieldingVarieties
of Wheat and Rice in the Less Developed Nations, Foreign Agricultural
Economic Report No. 95, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Washington, D. C., July 1974.8
agricultural policies toward greater reliance on international trade. It
is not always clear whether these moves are for rational economic reasons
which recognize the benefits of trade, or for domestic and international
political reasons. But even though we may not be sure of the motives, the
impact on the world food situation is clear and sometimes very pronounced.
The entry in a big way of the Soviet Union into world grain markets in
1972 illustrates this point. Unlike early 1963, when the Soviet Union
adjusted to a precipitous drop in domestic grain production by severe
belt-tighteningwhich involved liquidation of large numbers of livestock,
the Soviet Union decided in 1972 to maintain domestic levels of food con-
sumption through massive grain imports. This momentous decision may have
been due to a basic decision to liberalize trade policies and allow some
semblance of comparative advantage to work. But the decision may have
also been motivated by the political consideration that food shortages
helped to topple Nikita Khrushchev in the USSR and Wladyslaw Gomulka in
Poland. Regardless of motive, the impact of the Soviets’ action on the
world food situation is clear. And, large Soviet grain purchases in 1975
to compensate for a poor production at home is an indication that the new
Soviet food and agricultural policy continues to operate. One can find
numerous other, though less dramatic, instances where the decisions of
countries to follow less autarchic agricultural and general economic poli-
8/ ties has had a sudden impact on the demand for food in world markets.—
Each of these changes in the world food scene has resulted in a greater
“For example, the decisions of both Taiwan and Korea to increase
livestock production on the basis of a modern feed industry led to rapid
and historically discontinuous increases in feed grain imports during the
1960’s and 1970’s.interdependenceamong nations with respect to food supplies and food
prices. It has become increasinglydifficult for countries to insulate
their food positions from events in other countries.
Some major changes in the demand for and supply of food occur on a
systematic basis and can be predicted with a considerabledegree of cer-
tainty. The systematic changes are generally not overly disruptive of the
world food situation. Among the main forces producing regular growth are
income and population on the demand side and sustained productivity growth
on the supply side. But many other large changes--thoseresulting from
national calamities or sudden changes in economic policies--areunpredict-
able and can cause serious dislocation in the world picture. Thus, the
benefits to be derived from expanded and, hopefully, more economically
rational trade can be accompanied by greater uncertainties concerning
supply, demand, and price of food in world markets unless random fluctua-
tions are offsetting or reserve stocks of commodities exist to cushion the
price effects of unpredicted changes in supply or demand.
Until quite recently, variations in world food prices have been kept
within reasonable limits. This has been due in large measure to the
ability of the United States to expand agricultural production and to
maintain large food reserves in the 1950’s and 1960~s. These reserves were
in the form of grain stocks or idle production capacity. The ability to
draw on these stocks and reserve production capacity enabled the United
States to meet unpredictable food shortages, such as those caused by the
severe droughts in South Asia in 1965/66 and 1966/67, and to maintain a
reasonable degree of price stability in domestic and world markets.
In summary, the current world food situation, conditioned by economic
and demographic forces; national and international food, agricultural,and10
trade policies; and natural forces, namely unfavorable weather, can be
characterizedin the following way:
(1) The demand for food continues to increase at a fairly rapid pace
primarily because of growth of incomes in the industrial and
more rapidly developing less developed countries and continued,
rapid rates of population growth in most less developed countries.
(2) Food production has been unstable and has not kept pace with the
9/
growth in demand because of unfavorable weather conditions– in
various parts of the world and uneven rates of technological
advance.
(3) Reserve stocks of food (grains)have been depleted and currently
there does not exist a buffer against instability in production.
(4) Major areas of the world are more dependent than ever on world
markets as a means of achieving their food and agricultural
policy goals.
(5) Nominal world food prices are high and unstable, by historical
standards, and there is a distinct possibility that nominal and
real food prices might continue to rise for at least several years.
(6) For developed countries, high and unstable food prices have con-
tributed to inflation and instability in the overall level of
prices.
(7) For less developed countries that are net food exporters, high
food prices have made a positive contribution to foreign exchange
earnings and have helped to offset increased prices of
“Examples in 1975 are the USSR, Western Europe, and substantial parts
of the corn belt of the United States.11
nonagriculturalimports, particularlypetroJ.oum.
(8) In the case of less developed countries that are net food
importers, the current food situation has aggravated seriously
the shortage of foreign exchange and has
food prices as well. These developments
tion in the average diets in many of the
pushed up domestic
have led to deteriora-
poorer nations.
Interrelationsamong Domestic Agricultural
Trade and Development Policies
A distinctive feature of food and agricultural policies around the
world is the close interrelationshipbetween domestic and trade policies.
In fact, mechanisms for interferingwith the flow of agricultural products
in internationaltrade are usually an integral part of domestic agricultural
policies and programs. And, these domestic efforts are designed to bring
about substantial deviations between domestic and internationalprices of
agriculturalproducts. These price distortions bring about misallocation
of resources that contribute either positively or negatively to the total
world supply of food and its allocation among countries.
It is a legitimate activity of governments to implement social and
economic policies for the benefit of either agricultural producers or
consumers. Political pressures to do so have been historically strong
and likely will continue to be. It is naive to expect countries to
follow a laissez faire policy with respect to food and agriculture. What
can be hoped for is that countries will choose mechanisms for implement-
ing their policies that lead to improvement rather than deterioration in
the global food situation.
Most of the trade mechanisms used to implement domestic agricultural12
policies can be classified as nontariff barriers--quotas,export subsidies,
variable levies, sanitary regulations, etc. The various rounds of multi-
lateral trade negotiations carried out under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been singularly unsuccessful in liberalizing
agricultural trade because the GATT was not deeigned to negotiate nontariff
barriere. To negotiate such barriers is tantamount to negotiating domestic
agricultural policies, something that most countries have been unwilling
to do. However, serious consideration is being given in GATT and in other
internationalorganizations to the development of rules for dealing with
nontariff barriers and the liberalizationof agricultural trade without
requiring the abandonment of national food and agricultural policies.
In general terms, the objectives of domestic agricultural policies
may be either to support farm prices and incomes above levels that would
prevail under free market conditions, or to maintain consumer prices of
food and fiber below free market levels. Most market economies of the
world follow one basic approach or the other, with support to producers
found predominantly in the developed countries and support to nonfarm
consumers in less developed countries.
In the industrializedcountries the reasons for supporting agricul-
tural prices are basically twofold. One is to eliminate wide fluctuations
in prices which can result from relatively small shifts in very inelastic
supply and demand schedules for agricultural products. Another reason is
to deal with the low income problem in agriculture reflected by numerous
small producers with inadequate resources to generate earnings from farming
comparable to earnings in the nonfarm sector. (Some countries, such as
Norway and Sweden, have explicit policies of maintaining a certain propor-
tion of their population in agriculture or in certain rural areas.) The13
tendency toward low incomes stems from the inability of resources to Hhift
rapidly enough from agriculture to other sectors of the economy. The
income problem is exacerbatedwhen the agricultural sector is experiencing
rapid technologicalchange, as in the United States during the 1950’s and
1960’ S .
A typical response to the problem of low and unstable prices and
incomes is for governments to implement price support programs for major
commodities that maintain prices to farmers and consumers above equilibrium
levels. This was done in the United States in the 1950’s and currently
prevails in the European Community under its Common Agricultural Policy.
For a net exporting country it means the use of export subsidies to be
competitive in world markets. Even these subsidies (and substantial food
aid) did not prevent the accumulation of sizable surpluses. For importers
like the European Community it means protective barriers against imports
like the variable levy system (and export subsidies when exports are
called for). The combined effect of high price supports in both import-
ing and exporting countries is to increase domestic levels of production,
reduce consumption,and depress world market prices. The latter effect
tends to reduce production in countries that compete at world prices;
e.g., Canada and Australia in the case of grains.
Less severe are agriculturalpolicies which provide support to pro-
ducers but allow market prices to seek world levels. Consumption is not
reduced as a result of maintaining artificially high prices to consumers.
Production may or may not be stimulated, depending on whether the support
to producers is provided by price supports or by income payments unrelated
to production. The former system was used by the United Kingdom prior to14
joining the European Community and the latter by the United States since
the mid-1960’s.
Experience has demonstrated that high price supports will not in and
of themselves solve the problem of low incomes in agriculture. The inc~me
problem will have to be dealt with by a combination of direct welfare
measures, assistance for resource adjustment, and expanded opportunities
for nonfarm employment. The disenchantmentwith the farm income main-
tenance characteristicsof price support programs led the United States
10/ away from them in the 1960’s.— Proposals have also been made for the
European Community to find ways other than high price supports for dealing
11/ with the problem of low incomes in agriculture,— although as yet no
significantmoves have been made in this direction.
The situation in many developing countries is quite different from
what one finds in industrializednations. There is a strong desire in
many developing countries to keep the price of food to urban consumers
below world market levels. To the extent that this is accomplished, pro-
ducer prices are also depressed, This has been done with a variety of
mechanisms. Food exporting countries have used export tax mechanisms.
Examples where domestic prices to both consumers and producers have been
depressed below world market levels, and at times substantiallybelow,
are rice in Thailand and wheat and corn i.nArgentina. Food importing
10/ —U.S. Agriculture in a World Context: Policies and Approaches for
the Next Decade, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington,
D. C., July 24, 1973.
11/ — See A Future for European Agriculture, The Atlantic Papers No. 4,
The Atlantic Institute, Paris, 1970.15
countries have used imports, which
domestic markets, to keep domestic
The direct financial costs of such
were sold at subsidized prices in
consumer and producer prices low.
policies depend on the level of imports
and their unit costs. Food aid programs, such as P.L. 480, historically
provided developing countries with a cheap source of imports, and conse-
quently, the budgetary costs of maintaining low domestic food prices were
not high. The budgetary cost can be substantialwhen imports are obtained
at world market prices and the domestic subsidy is large. There are a
great many countries which have had cheap food policies. A few examples
are Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.
The general effect of low food price policies is to depress returns
to and discourage investments in agriculture, thus depressing the rate of
growth in output. At the same time, consumption is stimulated.
Food and Agriculture Policy Perspective
We now turn to a discussion of specific sets of policies which bear
directly on the current world food situation, The policy sets that will be
discussed are: (1) policies that lead to underinvestment in technological
and resource development in many less developed countries; (2) trade and
price policies in less developed countries that discourage the adoption of
known technologiesand the use of modern inputs; (3) protectionistic
policies in the developed countries that deprees world market prices and
limit export markets for less developed countries; (4) policies that con-
tribute to the instabilityof world prices; and (5) national and inter-
national development programs designed to increase food production in
developing countries.16
Underinvestmentin Agriculture
It Is no great secret that many countries, particularly the less
developed ones, do not assign high priority to agricultural development.
This is true even when the bulk of their gross domestic product comes
from agriculture and a high proportion of the population are employed in
agriculture. To the extent that any development is emphasized, it is
generally industrial development that is emphasized and not agricultural
development.
12/ In a study of 26 selected developing countries-- for the period
1948-63, only 12 had compound
4 percent a year or more. Of
growth of agriculturaloutput
rates of growth in agricultural output of
the remaining 14 countries, 5 had rates of
lower than those for population. The
study concludes that:
Rapid rates of
as a consequence of
societies organized
increase in crop output have not happened
normal economic and social processes in
on a laissez-fairebasis. Rather, they
have been undergirded by aggressive group action, generally
national in scope, directed specifically to improving agricul-
tural production conditions. (p. v)
India is an example
emphasis to agricultural
cultural sector. It has
of a country that has not given a great deal of
development in relation to the size of the agri-
had an uneven and less than spectacular long-
term rate of growth in agricultural output. Agriculture accounts for
about 50 percent of the net domestic product, and 80 percent of the total
population lives in rural areas and depends heavily on agriculture for
12/ — Changes in Agriculture in 26 Developing Countries, 1948-63, Foreign
Agricultural Economic Report No. 27, Economic Research Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., November 1965.17
their livelihood. Yet as the data in table 1 indicate, the percent of
total investmentsgoing to agriculture has declined from 25 percent in
the First Five Year Plan to 16,1 percent in the Fourth Five Year Plan,
while the proportion of investment going to large
and mining went from 23 percent to 39.2 percent.
not appear to be reversing in the Fifth Five Year
scale industry, power,
And, these trends do
Plan currently being
implemented. While these data do not prove a lack of sufficient commit-
ment to agricultural development in India, they certainly seem to indicate
it. A similar story can be told for all too many other developing
countries.
Behind the overall picture of a relative lack of interest in agri-
cultural development are numerous details. Two very important components
of more rapid growth in agricultural output are the development of land
and water resources and the development of new technology. With the excep-
tion of countries that have been able to exploit large amounts of unused
land, rates of growth in agricultural output are closely related to rates
of resource development and the capacity to generate new technology. (of
course, other aspects, such as infrastructuremarkets, credit, and price
policies, are also important.) In a comprehensive study of agriculture
in Asia,g’ these two areas receive high priority. Countries whose prog-
ress in agricultural development has been rapid, such as Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Israel, etc., have placed heavy emphasis on land and water resource
development and on technological change.
“Asian Agricultural Survey, Asian Development Bank, Manila,
Philippines, 1969. For an excellent discussion of the importance of new
technology see Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development:
































Trade and Price Policies
Trade and price policies that shift the terms of trade against the
agricultural sector discourage the use of known technology and modern
production inputs as well as retard longer-term investments in resource
and technologicaldevelopment. Policies repressive to the agricultural
sector are widespread among developing countries. Little, Scitorsky, and
Scott conclude, “the bias has been excessive: that in several of the
countries [studied] the effect on agricultural production has been damag-
ing, and that agricultural exports earned less than they should have done
,,14/ in most of the countries.—
Several studies deal with the strong effect that trade and price
policies have on the adoption of new technology and the use of modern
inputs. The results of some of these are worth summarizing.
15/ Ardila, Hertford, Rocha, and Trujillo— concluded that the S1OW rate
of adoption of improved varieties of wheat in Colombia was the result of
low domestic prices resulting from substantial imports of wheat under the
P.L. 480 program. 16/ De Janvry’s study-- of the use of fertilizer in cereal
production in Argentina concludes that high fertilizer prices resulting
14/ — Ian Little, Tibor Scitorsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade
in Some Developing Countries (London:Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 178.
15/ — Jorge Ardila, Reed Hertford, Andres Rocha, and Carlos Trujillo,
Returns to Agricultural Research in Colombia, Paper presented at the
Conference on Resource Allocation and Productivity in InternationalAgri-
cultural Research, Airlie House, Virginia, January 26-29, 1975.
~/Alain De JanvrY, “Optimal Levels of Fertilization Under Risk: The
Potential for Corn and Wheat Fertilization Under Alternative Price Policies
in Argentina,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, No. 1,
February 1972, pp. 1-10.20
from import tariffs and restrictions that protect a monopolistic and tech-
nologically obsolete fertilizer industry greatly inhibit its use. ‘1’he
development of new technologies to increase grain yields based on fertil-
izer are also retarded. He concludes that Argentina “is losing its inter-
national comparative advantages which have been resource based by not
participating in the Green Revolution when it could in fact be one of the
greatest beneficiaries.” A final example is rice production in Thailand
where the combination of an export tax on rice and a highly protected
domestic fertilizer industry has made expanded use of fertilizer unprofit-
able and resulted in a lower level of rice production and exports than
would have prevailed under product and factor prices approaching inter-
national levels. Welsch and Tongpan concluded in 1971 that changes in
rice and fertilizer prices are required if the new varieties of rice are
17/ to be adopted and fertlli.zer use expanded significantly.— These examples
should serve to illustrate that unfavorable trade and price policies in
many less developed countries retard growth in agricultural production
and contribute to a world food situation characterizedby strong demand
relative to supply and high prices.
ProtectionistPolicies in Developed Countries
It is well
tained domestic
known that most of
prices above world
the developed countries have main-
levels in their efforts to achieve
‘lDelane E. Welsch and Sopin Tongpan, Background to the Introduction
of High Yielding Varieties of Rice in Thailand, Staff Paper P72-6,
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota,




18/ protection for producers.— It is also well known that
agricultural policies cost the countries involved sub-
because consumers must pay high prices for food, exces-
sive resources are retained in agricultural production, and there may be
substantial drains on national treasuries. The main concern of this paper
is with the relationshipbetween policies and the
It is within this context that we want to look at
agricultural policies of the developed countries.
One effect of these protectionisticpolicies
world food situation.
the protectionistic
is to depress world
market prices. Importing countries reduce their levels of imports by
maintaining excess resources in their agricultures. Support to agricul-
ture may be so excessive that it can result in importing nations becoming
net exporters of some commodities,usually involving substantial export
subsidy costs. The EEC is a case in point. It is nearly self-sufficient
in sugar production; at times it has had substantial surpluses of dairy
products which it has disposed on world markets with sizable export sub-
sidies; and it has reduced its net imports of total grains (from 22.9 mil-
lion metric tons in 1965/66 to 13.3 million metric tons in 1973/74)Q’
18/ — For more detailed discussions of this point see Agricultural
Policies in 1966: Europe, North America, Japan, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1967; D. Gale Johnson, World Agricul-
ture in Disarray (London: Fontana, 1973); D. Gale Johnson and John A.
Schnittker, eds., U.S. Agriculture in a World Context: Policies and
@preaches for the Next Decade (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); ~
Future for European Agriculture, The Atlantic Papers No. 4, The Atlantic
Institute, Paris, 1970; and John S. Marsh, European Agriculture in an
Uncertain World, The Atlantic Institute, Paris, 1975.
“Data for the EEC(9). Foreign Agriculture Circular, FG1O-74,
Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington,
D.C., April 1974.in epite of rising domestic consumption, with exports of some grains,
~+llcll UH whcnt, being substantial in some years.
The disparity between agricultural prices in the EEC and world
markets is illustrated in table 2 for 1966/67. These data are reflec-
tive of market conditions which prevailed throughout the 1960’s and
early 1970’s; i.e., prior to the surge in world agricultural prices
since 1972. The extent to which EEC prices are above world prices ranges
from 15 percent for olive oil to 187 percent for sugar.
But the EEC countries are not the only ones that maintain high agri- ‘
cultural prices. From the data on producer prices for selected agricul-
tural products presented in table 3 one can get an idea of how widespread
is the support of agricultural prices and the wide range in price levels.
The producer price of wheat in 1968/69 ranged from less than U.S. $4 per
100 kg, in Argentina to over $14 in Finland, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland.
A similar pattern holds for the other commodities as well.
Among the developed countries, reduced imports by net importing
countries placed downward pressure on the demand for exports. This meant
that prices received by producers and production were depressed in those
developed exporting countries that did not insulate their domestic markets
from the world market, e.g., Canada and Australia in the case of grains.
Those developed exporters that did insulate domestic markets, such as the
United States, were faced with an accumulation of surpluses or the need
to purposely withhold resources, mainly land, from production. There
have been two “safety valves” for the excess production in the developed,
exporting countries; one was subsidized food consumption for the domestic
poor and the other was food aid to the less developed countries.23
Table 2. European Economic Community and World
prices for Agricultural Commodities, 1966/67
EEC price
Commodity EEC price World price as a percent
of world price

































































Source: G. R. Kruer and B. Bernston, “Cost of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy of the European Economic Community,” Foreign
Agricultural Trade of the United States, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Washington, D. C., 1969.24
Table 3. Producer Prices for Farm Products, 1968 or 1968/69,
US $ per 100 kg.
Wheat Whole milk
$4 or less Argentina
4-6 Canada
6-8 Denmark, U.K., U.S.A. Denmark, Ireland, Australia
8-10 Ireland, Greece, Sweden, U.K., Austria, France,
Austria, Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Portugal, Spain,
France, Netherlands Netherlands
10-12 Italy, Portugal, USSR W. Germany, Italy, Sweden,
Switzerland,U.S.A.
12-14 Norway
Over 14 Finland, Japan, Norway, USSR
Switzerland
Rice (Paddy)




30 or more Japan
Beef cattle Hogs
$30 or less Argentina
30-40 Denmark, Yugoslavia Argentina
40-50 Ireland, U.K., Canada U.S.A., Canada, U.K.,
Denmark, Ireland
50-60 U.S.A., Norway, Spain Austria, Spain
60-70 Belgium, France, W. Ger- W. Germany, Netherlands,
many, Sweden, Switzerland Italy, Norway, Greece,
Sweden
70-80 Italy Belgium, Switzerland, France
80-130











280 or more Switzerland
Source: Compiled by D, Gale Johnson, World Agriculture in Disarray
(London: Fontana, 1973), pp. 56-57.26
The depressing influence on world market prices of protectionistic
agricultural policies in the developed countries has had serious reper-
cussions for the less developed countries, all leading, in general, to
reduced incentives to develop agriculture and increase agricultural out-
20/ put at faster rater3.— Those developing countries bent on keeping
domestic consumer prices low were able to do so as a result of relatively
low world prices and a ready supply of food aid. In the process, producer
prices were also kept low and incentives to increase production were
21/ weakened by varying degrees.— The situation was further compounded
in those countries where investments in agricultural development were
20/ — For a detailed discussion of the effects of U.S. agricultural
policies on less developed countries see Martin E. Abel, “The Developing
Countries and U.S. Aj?riculture,” in D. Gale Johnson and John A. Schnittker,
eds., U.S. Agricultu~e in World Context: Policies and Approaches for the
Next Decade (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 138-181.
“Some of the more pertinent literature on this subject includes
T. W. Schultz, “Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries,”
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLII, No. 5, December 1960, pp. 1019-103O;
S. R. Sen, “Impact and Implicationsof Foreign Surplus Disposal on Under-
developed Economies--The Indian Perspective,” Journal of Farm Economics,
Vol. XLII, No. 5, December 1960, pp. 1031-1042; Franklin M. Fischer, “A
Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Food Surplus Disposal on Agricultural
Production in Recipient Countries,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 45,
No. 4, November 1963, pp. 863-875; Jitendar S. Mann, “The Impact of public
Law 480 Imports on Prices and Domestic Supply of Cereals in India,”
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1, Part I, February 1967,
pp. 131-146; Gary L. Seevers, “An Evaluation of the Disincentive Effect
Caused by P,L. 480 Shipments,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 50, No. 3, August 1968, pp. 630-642; Per Pinstrup-Andersonand
Luther G. Tweeten, “The Value, Cost, and Efficiency of American Food Aid,”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, No. 3, August 1971,
pp. 431-440; Peter Greenston, The Food for Peace Program and Brazil:
Valuation and the Effects of the Commodity Inflow, Ph.D. Dissertation,
Dept. of Economics, University of Minnesota, 1972; and Leonard Dudley and
Roger J. Sandilands, “The Side Effects of Foreign Aid: The Case of Public
Law 480 Wheat in Colombia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change,
Vol. 23, No, 2, January 1975, pp. 325-336.27
neglected because of the perception that there was an abundant supply
of food at low prices available in world markets.
Those developed countries that depend heavily on agricultural
exports for foreign exchange and development resources were also penal-
ized. Incentives to increase agricultural output and exports were weak,
given the levels of world prices and the limited export opportunities.
And, the foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports were also
depressed, thereby limiting the resources available to finance develop-
ment.
As already mentioned, some developing countries made a relatively
bad situation worse by imposing their own domestic policies which worked
against agricultural development. On the other hand, some other countries
did well in spite of world market conditions by emphasizing agricultural
development and, in some cases, emphasizing production of those agricul-
tural commodities for which world demand has been growing rapidly, e.g.,
fruits, vegetables, and beef.
Policies Contributing to Instability of World Prices
There are basically three ways in which policies have contributed
to instability in world prices of agricultural products. They have
reduced the price elasticity of import demand or export SUPPIY relations>
reduced stocks of agricultural products, and changed suddenly the reli-
ance of some countries on world markets enough to affect the behavior
of world market prices. We are concerned with short-term movements in
prices and will not consider policies which result in longer-term
secular or cyclical movements in prices.




the price elasticity of import demand and increased
resulting from a given change in supplies on world
the interventionhas been through the use of a variety
of non-tariff barriers that tend to make the import demand curve more
price inelastic. In the case of quotas or minimum import price schemes,
such as the variable levy system of the EEC, the import demand curve is
perfectly price inelastic over the range of prices (usuallywide) for
22/ which these mechanisms are operative.— The increased price inelasti-
city of import demand relations will add to instability in world prices
of commoditiesunless there are compensating increases in the price
elasticity of the supply of exports.
The existence of substantial stocks of agricultural commodities can
help stabilize prices if they are used to achieve that end. The Nixon-
Ford administrationshave worked diligently to reduce U.S. government-
owned stocks of major commodities,notably grains. There has not been a
compensatory increase in privately held stocks. Since 1972 there have
been insufficient stocks to cushion the price swings that have resulted
from variations in U.S. production and foreign demand.
Policies to reestablish reserve stocks of grain were promoted at the
World Food Conference held in November 1974. Little movement has occurred
in this area because of disagreements among countries as to who should
carry these stocks and how they are to be managed.
Another source of instability is the sudden shifts in food and agri-
cultural policies of countries that are large enough to significantly
~’mrtin E Abel . 9 “Price Discrimination in the World Trade of Agri-
cultural Commodities,”- Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 48, No. 2,
May 1966, pp. 194-208.29
affect world prices by their actions. The most recent and notable example
of such a shift was the change in the food and agriculturalpolicies of
the USSR which thrust them upon the world market in a large and unpredict-
able way. It is not the policy change per se, but the suddenness of it
which is important. The formation of a common agricultural policy by the
EEC represented a major agricultural policy change for a large trading
bloc. However, this change occurred gradually and in a predictablemanner.
Other countries had time to adjust to the EEC actions. This was certainlY
not the case with the Soviet Union in 1972.
Development Assistance Programs
Since World War II the development assistance programs of national
governments, internationalagencies, and private organizations have had a
major impact on the world food and population scene. These programs have
been directed at improving living conditions in the less developed coun-
tries by promoting economic growth, increasing agricultural output,
reducing death rates, reducing rates of population growth, and improving
the distribution of income and wealth.
The numerous development assistance efforts have had uneven rates of
success in achieving all of these objectives in all developing countries.
Some countries were either unreceptive to outside assistance or used it
inefficiently. At times the development assistance programs of some
countries and some internationalorganizations, aided and abetted by
national policies in recipient countries, were directed toward activities
that contributed little to improving the food situation in developing
countries; e.g., military assistance, heavy emphasis on industrialization
and the neglect of agricultural development, and rapid reduction of30
death rates, which resulted in a population explosion. And, develop-
ment assistance programs did not always recognize the complexity of the
problems which they were trying to solve.
Few would deny, however, that the development assistance programs
of the last 30 years were a grand and noble effort that improved the
lives of countless millions of people in the less developed world. Per
capita food supplies have been increased through the development and
adoption of better farming practices; increasing the yield potential of
crops and livestock; expanding irrigated area and reclaiming land;
increasing the availabilityof modern agricultural inputs; and bringing
more and more people into the process of agriculturalmodernization
through extension efforts, development of transportationand marketing
facilities, etc. Health conditions have been improved through the
reduction or elimination of ravaging diseases and increasing the avail-
ability of medical services. Education levels have been increased
substantially,particularlytith respect to skills required for develop-
ment. Institutionalcapacity has been built so that many countries are
better able to deal with their development problems. And, we have
learned a great deal about the complexity of the issues involved and
how to deal with them; e.g., we have learned that agricultural tech-
nology can not be effectively transferred from developed to developing
countries but must be developed to fit the ecological, factor, and
cultural endowments of the developing countries; that land reform is
easier to write about than to actually achieve; that problems of income
distribution and poverty are strongly rooted in political and cultural
characteristicsof nations; that Changing economic policies has its31
opponents as well as its proponents; and that changing these and other
aspects of societies and economies is a slow, difficult process requiring
wise and sustained efforts.
The capacity to assist developing countries is greater than it has
ever been. The collective talents and resources involved in national
development assistance programs, the World Bank, the regional develop-
ment banks, the various United Nations development agencies, and private
organizations is substantial. And, increasingly,thepriorities of these
various organizations is shifting toward solving problems of food, agri-
culture, population, and income distribution. These efforts can yield
substantial improvements in the world food situation if they are sus-
tained, if developing countries cooperate in realigning their policies
to improve the efficiency and productivity of development assistance
resources, and if other countries refrain from following policies
that lead to immiseration in the developing regions of the world--such
as unduly high prices of petroleum and overly restrictive trade practices.
The Net Effect of Policies
What can we say about the net effect on the current world food
situation of all the policies discussed? It is doubtful that one can
make precise quantitative estimates of the effect of policies on the
level of world food production, its distribution ~ong and within nations,
and the stability of production, prices, and trade flows. However, some
judgments can be made about the direction of the effects of different
policies on the world food situation,
The first judgment is that a great many developing countries are
not producing nearly as much food as they could. Partly this is due to32
their own policies, some which lead to a neglect of investments in the
agricultural sector --research, extension, infrastructure,development
of soil and water resources, etc., and some which shift the terms of
trade against the agricultural sector. Consequently, known ways to
increase productivity and output are not adopted and there is little
incentive to develop new sources of productivity growth. It is also true
that the restrictive trade policies of the developed countries create
distortions in world market prices which generally reduce prices of
agricultural products (and other primary and labor-intensivemanufactured
products as well) and the incentives to increase output in the developing
countries. There are a sufficient number of developing countries repre-
senting a wide range of resource endowments that have emphasized agri-
cultural development and have made notable strides in increasing agri-
cultural output to support our judgment that more can be done to increase
agriculturalproduction in other developing countries.
It is less clear what the net effect on world food supplies would be
if the developed countries followed agricultural policies that resulted
in less distortion of world market prices. Movement of more of the
developed countries toward policies that meet income and social objec-
tives without maintaining excessive resources in agricultural production
would undoubtedly lead to lower levels or rates of growth of production
in many importing countries and to higher levels of production in many
exporting countries. But it is not clear if “rationalization”of agricul-
tural policies among the developed countries will lead to greater, less,
or about the same level of total production among these countries or to
lower, higher, or about the same levels of world market prices for various33
commodities. We do not yet have an adequate empirical base for drawing
unambiguous conclusions about the effects of agricultural policy liberal-
ization in the developed countries.
Much could be done by the developed countries, and the less developed
ones as well, to reduce short-term price instability in world markets.
One step would be the establishment of reserves for major commodities,
such as grains, managed in ways that maintain price fluctuations within
certain bounds. The World Food Conference proposed establishmentof an
internationalreserve for grains. Many countries, especially the United
States, are wary of international efforts. They fear that international
reserves will be managed in ways contrary to national policy interests.
An alternative might be for several of the major producing and consuming
nations--U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, EEC(9), USSR, and PRC--to main-
tain reserves and informally coordinate their management. This approach
might circumvent some issues related to loss of national sovereignty.
Other steps that could be taken to lessen short-run price instability
in world markets center on the redesign of national agricultural policies
that increase the price elasticity of export supply and import demand.
The price effects of short-term fluctuations in demand or supply would
be shared by a larger number of countries and would be less concentrated
on policy-restrictedworld markets.
Countries which engage in major changes in food and agricultural
policies should be encouraged to do so on an orderly basis, giving markets
and policies in other countries time to adjust in a nondisruptive fashion.
Finally, development assistance activities will have to be acceler-
ated and focused more sharply on food, agriculture, population, and
income distribution problems. Ways will have to be found to achieve‘)4
closer coordination between national development priorities and foreign
development assistance efforts in order to improve the effectiveness of
such assistance. The difficult and long-term nature of agricultural
and economic development should be more widely recognized and incorporated
into development assistance programs of national governments and inter-
national agencies.